In this short comment, I will first recapitulate some of the substantive claims Textor attributes to Brentano, and then propose to use Kant’s epistemology to extend the central argumentative conclusion of Textor’s article, namely the assertion that “where there is something mental, there is awareness of marks”.

The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof (...) to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object. (shrink)

This article focuses on the interpretation of the metaphysical deductions of the higher cognitive faculties in Gabriele Gava’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics. The aim is to assess the role that Kant’s general logic plays in these metaphysical deductions, the consequences for the analysis of the faculties, and the place of general logic in Gava’s overall theoretical analysis of Kant’s first Critique.